The nature of dispersal of many invasive pests and pathogens in agricultural and forestry makes it necessary to consider how the actions of one manager affect neighbouring properties. In addition to the direct effects of a potential spread of a pest and the resulting economic loss, there are also indirect consequences that affect whole regions and that require coordinated actions to manage and/or to eradicate it (like movement restrictions). In this paper we address the emergence and stability of cooperation among agents who respond to a threat of an invasive pest or disease. The model, based on the weakest-link paradigm, uses repeated multi-participant coordination games where players' pay-offs depend on management decisions to prevent the invasion on their own land as well as of their neighbours on a network. We show that for the basic cooperation game agents select the risk-dominant strategy of a Stag hunt game over the pay-off dominant strategy of implementing control measures. However, cooperation can be achieved by the social planner offering a biosecurity payment. The critical level of this payment depends on the details of the decision-making process, with higher trust (based on reputation of other agents reflecting their past performance) allowing significant reduction in necessary payments and slowing down decay in cooperation when the payment is low. We also find that allowing for uncertainty in decision-making process can enhance cooperation for low levels of payments. Finally, we show the importance of industry structure to the emergence of cooperation, with increase in the average coordination number of network nodes leading to increase in the critical biosecurity payment.
Introduction
There are many situations where failure to achieve an outcome depends not only on one's actions, but also the actions of others (Sims et al., 2016) . For example, our efforts to prevent the spread of a disease can be undermined if someone else does not take appropriate precautions like hand washing, vaccination or protection (Kleczkowski et al., 2015; Maharaj and Kleczkowski, 2012) . One particular case on which we focus in this paper involves biosecurity in agriculture and forestry (Macpherson et al., 2017 (Macpherson et al., , 2016 . A lapse in biosecurity can result in the introduction and spread of animal and plant pests and pathogens, and can bring a large variety of negative consequences. These include the reduction in yield or quality of produce, reduced animal welfare, as well as the need to resort to costly and often unpopular reactive measures like widespread application of pesticides or culling. In addition, if one farm gets infected, biosecurity for others gets harder and so other farms are likely to follow, triggering a chain reaction (Fraser, 2016) . Wider 'indirect' impacts from an infection that affect more than just the farms that initially get infected include regulatory and market impacts, such as trade bans, movement restrictions, culls and other biosecurity measures (Haydon et al., 2004; Knight-Jones and Rushton, 2013; Moslonka-Lefebvre et al., 2016 ).
An example where indirect damages might be highly important is the case of a bacterial pathogen, Xylella fastidiosa (Forestry Commission, 2018) . It is a multihost plant pathogen (with 350+ suspected plant host species), spread by xylem-feeding insects. It is endemic in many places in the world but some European countries, including the UK are so far free from it (Forestry Commission, 2018) . X. fastidiosa has been spreading in southern European countries, devastating hosts like olive, almonds and oleander (Martelli et al., 2016) . Given the wide array of host, many of whom are asymptomatic, likely impacts include non-market ecosystem damages as well as commercial production losses. In countries like the UK the current main concern is not the direct damages, as the most vulnerable host species are not economically important and the xylem-feeding insects are less active with the cooler climate, but indirect damages. In the UK, the same EU crop protection regulations apply as those in Italy or Spain where the pest is present, with long-term movement restrictions in the radius of 10km around known outbreaks, lasting for as long as 5 years (Forestry Commission, 2018) .
For those that trade plants (e.g. plant nurseries) these regulations essentially mean destroying all hosts and a ban or severe restrictions in movement of host plants for a long period.
Importantly, the damage is not limited to the trader that through negligence introduced the pathogen into the area, but to their neighbours over a potentially large geographic area. In addition, the response might also include contact tracing (similar to the one employed in controlling Foot and Mouth outbreak in the UK in 2001 (Haydon et al., 2004) ) and so affect the sites located outside the immediate neighbourhood of the outbreak focus, but connected to it through trade. In short, if one agent employs lax biosecurity, other agents suffer.
Issues around biosecurity can be considered as a weakest link public good, where efforts to produce a desired level of biosecurity are undermined by a single actor in the population, even if all other actors implement the prevention measures (Perrings et al., 2002) . This feature, together with the assumptions that investment in biosecurity is costly, but only worthwhile if successful, can be captured in a game theoretical framework. In this paper we use the Stag hunt game paradigm to describe the strategic interaction among decision makers threatened with an outbreak of plant diseases. The key feature of the Stag hunt game (Skyrms, 2013; Van Huyck et al., 1990 ) is the emergence of two Nash equilibria, one of which is payoff dominant (when all players invest in biosecurity) and the other risk dominant (no players invest in biosecurity). We extend the concept of the Stag hunt game to a multi-player situation (Rich et al., 2005a) in which the interactions are described by a network with a mixture of spatial (local) links, representing geographic proximity, and random (non-local) links, representing trade movements between players (for an application of network theory to plant health and particularly Xylella, see (Jeger et al., 2007; Strona et al., 2017) ).
The Stag hunt game has extensively been studied both theoretically (Büyükboyacı, 2014; van Veelen and Nowak, 2012; Weidenholzer and Simon, 2010) and in experiments (Banerjee et al., 2014 (Banerjee et al., , 2012 , in a two-player and multi-player, network settings (Skyrms and Pemantle, 2009; van Veelen and Nowak, 2012) , and as a single or repeated game. The key feature emerging from these studies is that cooperation emerges only under very specific conditions.
In this paper we apply the repeated Stag hunt game model to address the emergence of cooperation among plant nursery managers faced with a business-threatening pest or disease (Rich et al., 2005a (Rich et al., , 2005b 
Methods.
We describe here a set of decision-making agents who broadly represent plant nursery managers, but who could also represent farmers growing crops or animals, or forest managers. Nurseries are connected to other nurseries either through local (geographical) links or through trade which can span the whole population; both types of links can facilitate spread of an invasive pest or disease. The network. We consider three network types. For the baseline case, we assume that the geographical structure is represented by a one-dimensional network with M=256 agents, d=2 nearest neighbours and periodic boundary conditions, i.e. a ring, see Fig. 1(a) . This could represent, for example, a set of nurseries based along a major road or railway; the period boundary condition simply allows us to ignore the influence of the end-points (van Veelen and Nowak, 2012) . We subsequently extend the model to represent non-local trade described by an addition of m random links connecting any node in the network to another node, Fig.   1(b) . The resulting network has a small-world property (Jeger et al., 2007; Watts and Strogatz, 1998) with an increase in the average degree but large decrease in the average path length. For comparison, we also include a different small-world-type network, implementing the Watts-Strogatz rewiring algorithm (Watts and Strogatz, 1998) ; the network is formed from the basic ring structure by rewiring of (on average) m randomly selected links to anywhere in the population, Fig. 1(c) . In such network the average degree does not change with m increasing, but the average path length decreases. The network is assumed to be static, with no response to the threats or changes in trading patterns (Gross et al., 2006) .
Basic game.
At each period of time (which could represent a year or a trading round), the agent is faced with a risk created by an invasive potential pest or disease which can be transmitted to the nursery from another place. Each agent can choose either to control/prevent the disease (C) or to do nothing (N). In our approach we do not model the actual spread of the pest but assume that the agent expects that if no control measure is taken on its premises or if at least one of the geographical or trading partners does not control the pest, then the plants at the nursery will be affected, resulting in the decrease in pay-offs. The consequences of the action C or N, both for the agent and for the neighbours, are realised in the same round and have no direct long-lasting consequences (except loss or gain of trust, see below).
Pay-offs.
In each trading period, agents sell plants, with the healthy material bringing in the profit of a (arbitrary units) and the affected material bringing in b (arbitrary units), with b a < . The choice to control (C) is associated with a cost, c, independent of what neighbours do, while doing nothing (N) has no upfront cost. We additionally assume that the government tries to encourage the agents to control and in each period offers a subsidy p to each agent who chooses strategy C. The basic pay-off structure is given in Table 1 . Own action:
C (all neighbours control) N (at least one neighbour does not control)
Repeated game. We assume that the game is played repeatedly and the agents have a full knowledge of the decisions of their neighbours in the past. Each agent's actions are based on the expected pay-off which incorporates an estimate of what neighbours are going to do in the next step which we express in terms of two probabilities.
is the probability that in step n+1 all neighbours connected to the agent i will be implementing the control measures,
represents the probability that at least one neighbour will not control. These probabilities can be evaluated assuming independence of neighbour decisions,
where i nb is the set of neighbours of agent i and ( ) 1 j n P C + represents the probability that the neighbour j adopts the control strategy in step n, as estimated by agent i.
Estimation of ( ) 1 j n P C + . In the model we assume that this is based on the information on the past performance of the agents. In the simplest case, this can be simply dependent on the last period; if any of the neighbouring agents selects strategy C, we can assume that it is likely to do this again in the next step. Let A natural extension of this process incorporates a form of trust-building (Bloembergen et al., 2015; Enright and Kao, 2015; Golman and Page, 2010; Skyrms, 2008) and bases the estimation of ( ) 1 j n P C + on a past history of the agent j's actions (Horváth et al., 2012) . In our approach this is based on as a weighted memory of whether that neighbour implemented control previously, but with recent actions having a greater weighting, so that the estimated probability that individual j implements control in step n+1 is given by Calculation of the pay-offs. Once the probabilities in Eq. (2) are calculated, the expected payoffs of the agent i can be computed as follows
[ ] Pure and mixed strategies. Deterministically, the agent will choose the action that has the highest expected pay-off, i.e. will always choose strategy C if
. However, this assumes that the agent possesses complete knowledge of the pay-offs and outcomes. In order to represent the uncertainty we use the idea of quantal response learning (Harsanyi, 1973; Mckelvey and Palfrey, 1998; Rosenthal, 1989) .
At each time step the agent i evaluates the expected pay-offs as described above but then chooses to play C randomly with probability Initial conditions. We assume that at time n=0 a new (invasive) pest poses a threat to the agents and then study how cooperation evolves in response to this threat. We consider two different initial conditions, one where most (80%) agents cooperate at the start of the model, and one where most (80%) agents initially do not implement control (i.e. 20% implement control). The first case corresponds to the situation when the cooperation is a default behaviour and we study whether it survives the change in the conditions. In the second case, we study whether the full cooperation will emerge over the long time.
Parameters. The pay-off values in the paper are arbitrary and for simulation purposes we choose 16, 6, 6 a b c = = = so that the profit from the infected material exactly balances the cost of control and the profit from the healthy material is higher than the profit from the infected material (note that the model considered here is invariant under the addition of the same constant to all terms in Table 1 
Results
A successful prevention or control of invasive diseases requires coordination of agent actions across the landscape. In this paper, we take it as our objective that as many agents as possible choose the control option (C) over the 'do nothing' option (N), given the level of payment, p.
We particularly address the dependence of the critical biosecurity payment needed to achieve cooperation, c p , on agents' memory τ , the parameter capturing the bounded rational behaviour of the agents, λ , and the number of long-range links, m. Bounded rationality. As λ decreases, the agents stop always adopting the strategy with the higher expected pay-off and start occasionally making 'mistakes'. For moderate 1 λ = (while the decision is still based only on the last state, 0 τ = ), the effect is twofold. Firstly, boundedly-rational behaviour leads to an increased range of values for the biosecurity payment p where cooperation levels in adopting control are high, Figs. 3(b) and 4(a) .
Secondly, some levels of cooperation persist for even smaller values of p, Fig. 3(b) and Fig.   4(a) , although disappear as p declines to 0, Fig. 4(a) . This counterintuitive behaviour emerges because the 'mistakes' allow clusters of cooperation to appear and to persist. The key to the stability of a cluster formed of agents adopting the C strategy is the perception of risk of the disease spreading amongst individuals at the end points of the cluster. They are likely to switch to N if they expect their neighbours to adopt N in the next step. However, if p is close to c, the difference between pay-offs If λ is reduced even more, the agents will display increasingly random behaviour without paying attention to what the neighbours have been doing. We find that full cooperation is no longer possible, even if the biosecurity payment is increased to p=c, but likewise some cooperation occurs even in the absence of the biosecurity payment, p, Fig. 4(a) . As 0 λ → , the proportion of agents selecting strategy C tends to 1/2 independently of other parameters or the biosecurity payment, p.
Memory and trust. As the agents start paying more attention to the past events so that 0 τ > , the initial condition plays a more important role and the variability in the temporal path increases, Fig. 3(c) , with some configuration of clusters of cooperation taking a very long time to convert to the N strategy.
When memory is short (small τ ), the main effect is to shift the critical value of the biosecurity payment, c p , towards low values, thus enhancing cooperation, cf. Figs. 3(c) and 3(d); summarised in Fig. 4(b) . Note that this requires some level of 'bounded rationality' to allow the neighbours of those who played N for a long time to consider playing C, as c p c = for any value of τ if λ → ∞ . For high levels of memory retention, 10 τ = , the region of biosecurity payment leading to consistent high cooperation levels is considerably widened, Fig. 4(b) . Thus, even if the agent neighbour plays N once after having played C for a long time, its neighbours are likely to ignore this and continue playing C; this leads to a reduced 'contagion' of the N strategy, but also requires some level of bounded-rational behaviour. The average proportion of agents choosing to control after T=1024 steps as a function of the number of random long-range links and the biosecurity payment; red colour represents no cooperation, orange to yellow represents increasing cooperation, and white corresponds to complete cooperation. (c) and (d): the average degree, (e) and (f) the proportion of agents with 3 or more connections (black) and 4 or more connections (blue), and (g) and (h) the average path length for networks used in (a) and (b). Left column corresponds to small-world networks formed by addition of long-range links and right column to rewired small-world networks. Other parameters: M=256, 1 λ = and 1 τ = ; the initial proportion of cooperators is 80% and the number of replicates is 25.
Trade and random links. The results so far assume a network of interactions with every agent influenced by their two nearest neighbours. As the number of additional long-range links representing trade increase, the critical biosecurity payment needed to encourage cooperation in disease control also increases for the addition network, Fig. 5(a) . This is to be expected, as the additional links increase the average degree, Fig. 5(c) , which means more agents are needed to adopt the control strategy for the population-level cooperation to succeed.
However, the rewired network has a constant average degree, Fig 
Discussion and Conclusions.
High risks of invasive pests and diseases like X. fastidiosa often lead authorities to impose draconian consequences if the disease agent is found on the premises. Moreover, not only those directly involved are affected by the emergency control measures, but also their neighbours will likely lose profits (and in the extreme, livelihoods). In this paper we have developed a modelling framework based on the concept of a weakest link public good and used it to examine conditions under which cooperation can emerge in the population of agents potentially affected by the spread of a pest or disease.
The lack of control in our model is a very strong transferable externality, as even a single person who does not implement biosecurity measures can cause huge losses across the whole industry (Shogren and Crocker, 1991) . Hence, a rational response of agents to the disease threat is to mistrust their neighbours and assume the worst outcome -if any of them decides not to control the pest, all will be affected. As a result, agents tend to give up the control strategy, unless the state subsidy for biosecurity, p, fully compensates them for the costs of control, c. Hence, even if we start with a population in which almost all agents initially control, the agents most in contact with those that do not control will find that the best strategy is to cease to implement precautionary control, eventually resulting in the loss of cooperation in the whole population.
In the paper, we have explored ways in which behavioural mechanisms (bounded rationality, trust) can lower the critical threshold and, finally, what the role of long-range trade is. We found that both trust and bounded rationality tend to lead to higher levels of cooperation, even if the biosecurity payment is lower than the costs of control. In particular, the dependence of the agent's choice of strategy on the past decisions of their neighbours significantly increases the chances that the cooperation will emerge in the whole system, with the critical values of the biosecurity payment decreasing with increasing the characteristic time for the memory, . < for a given value of τ , cooperation can persist for a long time, as exemplified in Fig. 3(c) . Interestingly, the persistence time (defined here as the time needed for the proportion of agents adopting the control strategy to drop from 80% to 20%) scales with τ according to a power law, Interestingly, the increased potential for 'errors' in calculating expected profits corresponding to decreasing λ also makes cooperation more likely, unless the difference in pay-offs is high (Gächter, 2017) . This can be associated with 'forgiveness', as the agents are more likely to forget one period when a neighbour 'cheated' and did not implement control, assuming the loss is not very big. This mechanism offsets the contrasting behaviour when the agent makes a mistake in the other direction and stops controlling even though all its neighbours choose to control. This also points in the direction of future research that would attempt to capture in more detail the decision-making process of agents faced with invasive disease or pest threats.
Industry structure also plays an important role in determining whether cooperation emerges or persists in the population, given our interpretation of industry structure as representing the number of trading links between farmers/foresters. Our results show that this is primarily driven agents who have more trading "neighbours" being less likely to adopt the control strategy. Those individuals then play a similar role to non-cooperators in Enright & Kao, (2015) , although in our model there is no additional heterogeneity in their behaviour. More work is needed to identify whether the network topology, as exemplified here by the average path length, Fig. 5 (g) and 5(h), also influences the dynamics of cooperation. In addition, in our model the network structure is fixed, whereas in reality, the agents might respond to disease threat by rewiring the trading pattern in the repeated game; such dynamic and adaptive networks have been a subject of intense research (Gross et al., 2006; Maharaj and Kleczkowski, 2012) and our model can be extended in this direction.
In our model, the process of actual disease spread is not explicitly incorporated in the framework, as we only look at the response of the agents to the disease threat (rather than the disease presence). This is probably the reason why network topology does not seem to play as important a role as the number of neighbours. An obvious extension of the model would be to incorporate an explicit epidemiological component to the model which represents the process of pathogen or pest spread and growth. Another extension would be incorporation of heterogeneity in the agent pay-offs (e.g. the profit from selling the healthy stock, a, or the cost of control, c) in addition to the number of connections considered in this paper.
